Claiming that the People’s Republic of China and Cuba are not so different may seem, at first glance, like a misleading assertion. In fact, it almost sounds contradictory when one considers the levels of development and economic growth both countries have reached over the past century.

Since the Deng Xiaoping era, China has experienced sustained periods of advancement that have driven remarkable industrialization and urbanization processes within the so-called “Global South,” while also consolidating its rise in the hierarchy of the international system, despite its current internal tensions. Cuba, on the other hand, appears to have remained stuck, after the collapse of Soviet aid, in a persistent cycle of multidimensional crisis, systematic repression, and increasing migratory flows that continue to spread across the hemisphere.

Similarities and Asymmetries

If we consider the nature of both political regimes and their global projection, the initial statement begins to make sense. Beyond the deep economic and structural differences between China and Cuba, both nations share the status of single-party authoritarian regimes, closed to political competition and founded on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

Regarding international projection, both regimes share a strategic interest in consolidating their influence within multilateral organizations and advancing various agendas: from promoting the multipolar reform of the world system, to asserting Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan and the South China Sea or denouncing the end of the US embargo against Havana.

Moreover, despite the marked asymmetry in material resources, both China and Cuba possess capabilities to deploy soft power strategies, grounded in significant symbolic capital. Although the Cuban regime is unable to sustain economic diplomacy projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, it has managed to secure notable international support through mechanisms such as summit diplomacy, inter-party cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges—all of which are central elements of Chinese foreign policy since the Mao era.

This comparison aims to draw attention to a phenomenon that is underexplored in academia and generally ignored by public opinion: the international influence capacity of the Cuban regime. While there is abundant literature on the mechanisms of internationalization in the Chinese case, equivalent efforts on Cuba are scarce.

A notable exception is the work of Gobierno y Análisis Político A.C., which analyzes precisely the asymmetries between the spread of Cuban sharp power and the material capabilities of the island regime. This can be complemented by what I propose in this short essay as similarities in the global projection models of Beijing and Havana—via summit diplomacy, inter-party cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges.

Summits, Parties, and Peoples

Summit diplomacy should be understood not only as meetings between heads of state, but as spaces for symbolic articulation and political narrative production. Cuba has advanced in this kind of diplomacy, once again thanks to the symbolic capital of the Revolution and anti-imperialism. A notable example is the “Patria” International Colloquium, the latest edition of which was held in March 2025 in Havana, gathering more than 400 delegates from 47 countries, including journalists, academics, and activists.

The forum did not aim for economic agreements or multilateral treaties; its goal was to strengthen a discursive front of the Global South that denounces the “technological blockade” against Cuba, expresses solidarity with causes such as Palestine, and proposes a “cognitive war” against Western media. This type of diplomacy seeks to consolidate ideological networks more than attract investments and to position Cuba as a key player in global resistance.

China has promoted similar gatherings, such as the Global South Media and Think Tank Forum, recently held in Brazil and attended by representatives from dozens of countries to articulate a collective narrative on reforming the international order.

Driven by the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese public universities, and state media like Xinhua, the forum has served, for example, to consolidate the Global South Think Tanks Alliance, a network of think tanks aligned with the Chinese discourse of “inclusive multilateralism” and “governance with Chinese characteristics.” Like Cuba, China understands that the global battle for legitimacy is also fought on the terrain of ideas, and that journalists and intellectuals are key allies in that contest.

Another central axis of these strategies is inter-party cooperation, a form of parallel diplomacy that operates outside traditional channels. In China’s case, the International Department of the CCP’s Central Committee maintains relations with hundreds of political parties around the world.

This network enables cadre exchanges, institutional visits, and ideological seminars promoting the single-party model, state centralization, and development without liberal democracy, as observed by various academics and think tanks. This party diplomacy, largely invisible to the public, builds an international community of authoritarian affinity, where values, tactics, and anti-democratic discourse are socialized.

Cuba, although perhaps with less reach, has developed similar ties with various leftist parties—including the Chinese Communist Party—particularly in Latin America. The visit of Carolina Rangel Gracida, Secretary General of Morena (Mexico), to Havana in May 2025 exemplifies this dynamic.

The cooperation agreement signed between Morena and the Cuban Communist Party reinforces not only a bilateral relationship, but also a regional network of party organizations that mutually support each other’s political models and legitimize themselves ideologically. These ties allow Cuba to compensate for its structural weakness with highly valuable symbolic capital: the Revolution, internationalism, and resistance.

Finally, both Cuba and China have made people-to-people exchanges—especially in education and technical training—a key part of their soft power. China offers thousands of scholarships to students from the Global South, promotes its Confucius Institutes, and has established overseas university campuses—like Peking University in Oxford—all accompanied by programs that teach the “Chinese perspective” of state-led development and authoritarian governance as not only valid but desirable models.

In parallel, Cuba has consolidated initiatives like medical training for Latin American youth, including Mexican doctors studying at the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM), in an environment where technical training coexists with revolutionary and anti-imperialist values. Additionally, through events like the International Congress on Higher Education “University,” Cuba has signed agreements with foreign universities from both democratic and non-democratic countries, reinforcing its global indoctrination network.

Together, these three dimensions—summits, parties, and peoples—tend to intertwine, revealing a shared logic in the global strategies of Cuba and China: the use of soft power as a tool to reinforce their political model, challenge global common sense, and weaken democratic public opinion. The difference between the two regimes is not one of intent, but of scale. China seeks to redesign the world order from the center; Cuba seeks to resist it from the margins. But in both cases, the same premise underlies their actions: in the 21st century, ideas remain a domain of power.

This article was translated into English from the original in Spanish.