A recent analysis by the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) evaluates several political and military scenarios regarding how the United States might act toward Cuba. CSIS has previously examined other aspects of the current relationship between the two countries (for example, the presence of Chinese intelligence facilities on Cuban territory). Although this latest study is presented as a forward-looking exercise, its real value lies not in predicting a military intervention or assigning probabilities to specific scenarios, but in raising important questions about US policy toward Cuba.
The report begins with a key assumption: that a scenario of increasing and sustained pressure in various areas worsens the internal situation of the Cuban regime. From there, CSIS experts explore five possible scenarios, ranging from continued pressure without direct intervention to more extreme options such as air strikes or even an operation aimed at decapitating the political leadership. Their conclusion is consistent: none of these options guarantees a politically viable outcome.
The first scenario involves continuing the strategy of economic pressure on Cuba by restricting its oil imports in order to force reforms within the regime. It is a strategy of attrition that relies on the gradual deterioration of the Cuban economy as a mechanism of coercion. Operationally, the strategy is straightforward. The Cuban armed forces lack significant naval capabilities, and their allies (Russia and China) are neither in a position nor inclined to intervene, making restrictions on imports effective—even without direct military deployment—through the deterrence of third countries. Even if attempts were made to circumvent the restrictions, they would not substantially alter the outcome.
However, according to the CSIS study, the principal challenge would be political. On the one hand, there is the risk of confrontation if other actors decide to challenge the blockade. On the other, the reputational cost to the United States grows as the worsening situation inside Cuba portrays it as a coercive actor. In this context, isolated actions by Russia—such as sending and later canceling oil shipments—reflect both geopolitical tensions and the limits, as well as the possible intensification, of this pressure strategy.
To these CSIS arguments, I would add the possibility that Cuban authorities might make gestures designed to buy time and mitigate the effects of fuel import restrictions, as occurred with the pardon of common prisoners in the context of the arrival of a Russian oil tanker last March. These events, seemingly unrelated, can be understood as part of a pattern developed by the Cuban government based on releasing a small number of political and common prisoners in exchange for measures that are politically advantageous to it, depending on the circumstances.
The second scenario envisions an internal collapse in Cuba leading to a humanitarian crisis and a power vacuum, prompting a US intervention to restore order. According to CSIS, although the regime has demonstrated considerable resilience, a sudden deterioration with difficult-to-predict consequences cannot be ruled out, characterized by state disintegration, mass protests, and unrest. If the collapse occurred without widespread disorder, US intervention would be limited to securing ports and airports to facilitate humanitarian aid. However, a total breakdown of order would require the deployment of substantial ground forces.
According to standard stabilization-operation criteria, one security officer would be needed for every 50 inhabitants. In Cuba’s case, this would require approximately 100,000 troops, assuming half would come from local forces. However, it is unlikely that either the United States or a regional coalition would undertake a commitment of that magnitude, as evidenced by recent difficulties in assembling even smaller contingents for Haiti.
The third scenario proposes a strategy of decapitating the Cuban leadership through a special forces operation or a targeted strike against figures such as Raul Castro and Miguel Diaz-Canel. The objective would be to demonstrate US capability and determination to the rest of the elite, as occurred against Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. However, such operations are complex. They require highly precise intelligence and favorable conditions, including months of preparation and intelligence support on the ground. A direct troop deployment carries significant risks, including casualties or captures, making a limited strike more likely, though it would still depend on reliable intelligence.
Moreover, eliminating the leadership would not guarantee the collapse of the regime. Unlike other cases, Havana’s system does not depend on a single individual, making it likely that the Communist Party, the armed forces, and the intelligence apparatus would respond by hardening their positions. Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that Cuba does not have a counterpart to Delcy Rodríguez. In short, although a decapitation operation is militarily feasible, its political effects are uncertain, according to CSIS: it would not guarantee the regime’s immediate downfall and could actually strengthen its internal cohesion.
The fourth scenario suggests that the United States could carry out air strikes against military targets in Cuba to pressure the regime into accepting significant changes and weaken its ability to resist future actions. From an operational standpoint, US armed forces possess the capability to sustain several days of bombing. Such attacks would focus on intelligence facilities, air-defense systems, and other military assets.
Although Cuba’s air-defense capabilities are limited, neutralizing them would allow the United States to operate more freely and use more conventional and less costly weaponry. According to CSIS, the main constraint is political and strategic. If the Cuban regime maintains its cohesion and does not face a significant internal uprising, air strikes alone are unlikely to bring about its collapse.
The final scenario envisions an unforeseen event triggering a US military response. Such situations are difficult to predict and can arise from miscalculations amid increasing military tensions. Incidents such as the downing of a spy plane during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or the explosion of the USS Maine in 1898 demonstrate how isolated events can escalate into larger conflicts. In the current context of aggressive rhetoric and military deployments, an incident involving US American casualties could trigger escalation through limited air strikes or actions against the Cuban leadership.
Nevertheless, a large-scale invasion remains the least likely scenario. Cuba lacks significant military capabilities to deter the United States, although it could undertake asymmetric actions such as the use of drones. A ground intervention would require at least 100,000 US troops—a costly, slow, and highly visible deployment that reduces its political and strategic viability. Furthermore, such a scenario does not align with the practices of the current US administration, as seen in Iran and Venezuela.
The CSIS study concludes that the Cuban regime would seek to prevent a rapid US victory—whether military or negotiated—by delaying any agreement until after the US congressional elections of November 2026. This logic is linked to two common practices of Cuban authorities: buying time and operating according to a guerrilla mindset. Every day the regime survives is considered a victory, even though this approach entails significant risks, such as internal collapse or a humanitarian crisis—possibilities that the Cuban elite is willing to manage as long as the cost of repression remains lower than the cost of negotiating a settlement.
The United States has several strategic objectives regarding Cuba: weakening its intelligence ties with China, preventing support for Russia, opening the economy, and creating conditions for the return of migrants. However, CSIS argues that the Trump administration needs a clear strategy for change that both achieves these objectives and enables a democratic transition in Cuba.
Regardless of the conclusions reached by CSIS experts, I believe it is evident that the United States intends for the Cuban regime to fracture from within. The application of economic sanctions and increased pressure across multiple fronts, combined with contacts by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the commander of US Southern Command with senior Cuban military and intelligence officials—the real holders of power—point in that direction. The recent meeting between a Republican congressional candidate and Raul Guillermo Rodriguez Castro, grandson of Raul Castro, who expressed his intention to modernize Cuba, bring it into the twenty-first century, and have President Trump lead the process, is another indication of this.
In any case, the minimum requirements for a democratic transition in Cuba are codified in US law. The Helms-Burton Act establishes a set of essential measures for such a transition. Therefore, any involvement of US capital in Cuba’s economic recovery should be based on the provisions of that legislation. The Helms-Burton Act functions as a framework that links economic opening to substantive political transformations, reminding the regime’s elite that there will be no sustainable reconstruction without effective democratic guarantees.
This article was translated into English from the original in Spanish.
